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Abstract—We propose a method of generating different scale-
free networks, which has several input parameters in order to
adjust the structure, so that they can serve as a basis for computer
simulation of real-world phenomena. The topological structure of
these networks was studied to determine what kind of networks
can be produced and how can we give the appropriate values of
parameters to get a desired structure.
amely az rzkels, rzet, megismers s megrts kztt zajl agyi
folyamatok mrnki informatikai modellezse
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently scale-free networks stand in the focus of research
in several fields of science. Large scale of complex systems can
be modeled using these structures (Social networks, ecological
phenomena, metabolic processes, etc.) [1]. In the last decade
it also even turned out, that the human brain itself, as a
network of correlated brain sites shares scale-free properties.
Today this latter result is a pillar of modeling processes of the
brain e.g. between cognition and understanding [2], [3]. As a
basis of these researches scientists need methods to generate
networks with properties similar to the object of their interest.
In our case the main reason to create such networks is to
investigate information spreading on them. In the literature a
huge number of algorithms can be found such as preferential
attachment [4], [5], its extension with accelerated growth [6],
fitness-driven process [7], etc. However networks generated
by these methods usually differ from the needed ones because
the low amount of their parameters. There are efforts to create
tunable methods, but they can change only few properties of
the resulted networks [8], [9], [10]. The goal of our research
is to develop a network generation process, in which the input
parameters can determine more structural properties. The far
aim of this work is to create structures on which we can
investigate spreading processes (using the model of Kocsis and
Kun [11]). Namely we want to know how fast is the informa-
tion spreading between agents of a specially created scale-
free topology representing an online network. Since most of
these networks share the same universal topological structure,
it is likely that our method to generate networks like these,
and the outcome of the research of the information spreading
can be applied to heterogeneous human-computer networks as
well, that seems to dominate future internet communication
networks [12].
II. THE MODEL
History shows, that during the life-cycle of online social
networks they go through more than one distinct phases.
Namely after introduction, growing, and maturity sooner or
later they start to decline. This phenomenon makes it rea-
sonable to apply a two step generation process. Our grow-
and-destroy network generation model has two stages. It is a
mixture of the simple popularity-driven (BA) and the fitness-
driven algorithm [8] extended by different attack methods.
The generation of a growing network starts from a small
connected network of m0 initial nodes where each node has 2
neighbors. The network is increased node-by-node. Each new
node is linked to m = m0 − 2 chosen from the existing ones.
According to the BA algorithm the probability of connecting
a new node j to node i is proportional to the actual number
of connections ki of this node. Namely
pBAji =
ki
j−1∑
l=1
kl
. (1)
In contrary in the fitness-driven model each node has a
randomly assigned fitness value (a real value between 0 and
1) and the probability to join to node i is given by the product
of this fitness value and the number of existing links of the
given node ki. Thus
pFji = fjp
BA
ji = fj
ki
j−1∑
l=1
kl
. (2)
Each node is linked to the network using BA algorithm with
probability p and using fitness-driven method with probability
1− p so the probability of a node j to be linked to an already
connected node i is
pji = pp
BA
ji + (1− p)p
F
ji. (3)
The result is a connected growing network.
However in many cases (e.g. online social networks) nodes
are removed from the network as time passes. Thus when
the size of our network N0 reaches a desired value it goes
through a so-called attack method. Namely Na nodes (and
their links) will be removed from the network effecting funda-
mental structural properties of it. We take into account three
completely different scenarios of removing. Thanks to the rich
gets richer property [4] of preferential attachment, older nodes
of the network (who were connected to the network earlier)
can have more connections then younger ones. As a result of
this the properties of a network are different if older nodes die
out first or if recently attached, instable parts of the system are
removed first or if the removing probability does not depends
on number of connections.
To catch this above described declining process of the
network we used three different ways of attacking called
central, peripheral and general attack. Central attack means
that the removing probability of node i is proportional to the
value of its connections ki. During peripheral attack nodes
with a smaller number of neighbors have larger probability to
remove while in the third case all nodes have the same chance
to be removed. The strength of the attack η can be defined
by the fraction of the original and the removed number N of
nodes
η = Na/N0 = (N0 −N)/N0. (4)
With the use of this complex grow-and-destroy network
generation model one is able to produce a large variety of
undirected scale-free network topologies.
III. RESULTS
Based on the literature and our previous experiences we
were interested in the following properties of the generated
network topologies:
i) Degree-distribution P (k), i.e. what percentage of the
nodes have a given number of neighbors.
ii) Average degree 〈k〉, namely the average number of
links of each nodes.
iii) Cluster size distribution, where cluster means a small
network which is not connected to others.
iv) Dominance of the giant component, i.e. what percent-
age of nodes take place in the by far largest cluster of
the network.
v) Average clustering coefficient 〈C〉 which describes
how often neighbors of an average node are connected
directly to each other as well.
Our model has five input parameters: system size (N0),
dominance of popularity-driven algorithm (p), number of links
of a new node (m), type of attack process controlled by p
and the strength of attack (η). We wanted to know how the
network properties depend on these parameters, explore this
huge parameter space and determine the available regimes
of network properties. In order to do this a large number of
network generations have been carried out.
A. Degree-distribution
Most nodes of the generated networks have only a few
neighbors. However there are some nodes with many connec-
tions to others. The degree-distribution P (k) obeys power law
behavior, since it is a scale-free network. The exponent γ of
the distribution is tunable, its value depends on the dominance
of the BA-algorithm p (Fig 1 inset). The number of neighbors
of a new node m during the generation has no influence on the
value of the exponent just shifts the curves. Data collapse can
be achieved by rescaling by 2m2, thus the degree distribution
can be written in this form
P (k) = 2m2k−γ(p). (5)
After the attack the degree-distribution can change. In the case
of central attack first the exponent increases then the power
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Fig. 1. Degree-distribution of original and differently attacked networks at
attack rate η = 0.4 (N0 = 106, m = 3). General and peripheral attack does
not change degree distribution. Inset: The exponent of degree-distribution γ
as a monotonous function of p.
law behavior disappears quickly, while in case of general
and peripheral attack the power law dependence remains with
almost the same exponent independently from the strength of
attack η. (See Fig. 1.)
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Fig. 2. The average degree of nodes 〈k〉 depends on the attack rate (η) at
a certain value of m, however this dependence is determined by the type of
the attack. (N0 = 106, m = 3, p = 0.1)
B. Average degree
The average degree (the average number of neighbors of
a node) is determined only by the value of m in the case of
unattacked networks. However when nodes are removed the
average value of k is changing. When we apply peripheral
attack 〈k〉 is decreasing slowly, while in the case of central
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Fig. 3. The cluster size distribution at several attack rate from 0.1 to 0.4 in
the case of central attack (N0 = 106 , m = 3). The exponent τ is decreasing
with η. Inset: Number of clusters in the system depends on attack rate η. The
curves belong to central and general attack. Peripheral attack results in only
a few clusters so the exponent can not be studied for that case.
attack nodes loose their connections very fast as expected.
When general attack is used the reduction is between the
former two cases. Except the cental case the value of the av-
erage number of connections 〈k〉 is decreasing almost linearly
with the strength of attack this is presented on Fig. 2. Not
surprisingly the dominance of preferential attachment p has
no influence on the value of 〈k〉.
C. Exponent of cluster size distribution
While the originally generated network is connected, as a
reason of the attack process it breaks up to separate clusters.
Usually there are some small separate groups of connected
nodes and (in most of the cases) one so called giant component
containing majority. Excluding this giant component the num-
ber of clusters n(S) of size S decreases as a power law (See
Fig. 3). By applying different attack methods it turned out that
central attack results the lowest exponent and the most clusters.
In contrary general attack leads to the lower number of clusters
and to a higher exponent. Peripheral attack results more than
one clusters only if we apply extreme attack rate. However
such an extreme attack (above 0.9) usually results in a so
damaged network that makes it impossible to run simulations
with practicable results. In all three cases the strength of the
attack η and the number of edges of new nodes m have a
large influence on the value of the exponent τ . Consequently
the size distribution of clusters (without the giant component)
n(S) can be cast to the form of
n(S) ∼ S−τ(η,m). (6)
The value of the exponent τ shows monotonous dependence
of the attack rate η (see Fig. 3). The number of clusters in the
system as a function of the attack rate η has also power law
functional form as it is presented on the inset of Fig. 3.
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Fig. 4. Average degree 〈k〉 of nodes has an influence on the size of the
giant component, as the monotonous curves show. Namely more links result a
larger giant component. Inset: The dominance of the giant component Sg/N
as a function of attack strength η (N0 = 106 , m = 3). Note that in a
peripherally attacked network the giant component is always present (blue),
while if nodes with high value of degree are removed the giant component
disappears if η > 0.4 (green), because the size of all clusters are in the same
order of magnitude.
D. Dominance of giant component
As it was presented above, as a result of the attack process
clusters are present in the system, and most of the nodes
form a giant cluster at low values of η. Increasing the attack
strength this cluster looses its significance and become almost
the same size as the other regular clusters. (See Fig. 4 inset.)
This process is highly similar to percolation, where the size
of this giant component Sg can be interpreted as a kind of
order parameter of this second order phase transition [13].
Using central attack the giant component disappears fast,
while using peripheral attack the giant component stays always
dominant almost independently of the strength of the attack.
The transition point where this cluster is negligible can be
shifted with the value of m. As expected, if more links are
added at the generation to each nodes a larger giant component
will be formed at a given η. However the dominance of the
BA or the fitness driven algorithm described by the parameter
p does not effect the size. The average degree 〈k〉 and the
dominance of the giant component Sg/N are not independent
from each other. Larger 〈k〉 results a larger giant component
as it is illustrated in the Fig. 4.
E. Average clustering coefficient
The value of the average clustering coefficient 〈C〉 is
proportional to m if m > 1. The growing method also has
an effect on 〈C〉. The neighbors of a randomly chosen node
are linked together more often in a fitness-driven generated
system then in a simple popularity-driven generated one (Fig.
5). In both cases the increasing of the system size N0 leads
to a power law decay of the average clustering coefficient.
The three attack methods affect the coefficient completely
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Fig. 5. The average clustering coefficient as a function of dominance of BA
algorithm, where N0 = 106 and m = 3. Inset: average clustering coefficient
〈C〉 strongly depends on the type of attack process and its strength (p = 0.1).
differently. General attack does not change the value of 〈C〉
for small values of η. In the case of central attack the average
clustering coefficient decays very fast and becomes zero.
Peripheral attack removes nodes with few connection thus the
value of 〈C〉 is increasing with attack rate η. Inset of Fig. 5
illustrates these results.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this work we developed a novel method of generating
tunable underlying network topologies for social simulation.
As it was presented using our grow-and-destroy method one
is able to generate scale-free network topologies with several
tunable properties. Table I summarizes the minimum and
maximum values of the studied quantities. These ranges of
the output properties are not independent from each other, not
all combinations of them can be generated.
TABLE I. LIMITS OF THE STUDIED TOPOLOGICAL STRUCTURE
PROPERTIES
2.4 < γ < 2.9
0.1 < 〈k〉 < 9.0
2.5 < τ < 7.0
0.0 < 〈C〉 < 0.1
0.0 < Sg/N < 1.0
Table II gives a short overview how the input parameters
affect the output quantities. In the table ↑ indicates that with
the increase of the input value the value of the output is also
increasing and ↓ shows that an increasing input value results
a decrease of the output. ◦ stands where the output does not
depend on the input. l notes that both an increase or a decrease
is possible depending on the type of the attack.
Using our generation method we managed to generate
different network families, e.g. one large connected network,
a group of networks with or without a giant component, dense
and connection-poor networks, etc. In our future research we
TABLE II. INFLUENCE OF THE INPUT PARAMETERS TO THE OUTPUT
PROPERTIES.
p m η
γ ↑ ◦ ◦
〈k〉 ◦ ↑ ↓
τ ◦ ↑ ↓
〈C〉 ↓ ↑ l
Sg/N ◦ ↑ ↓
plan to investigate information spreading on these generated
network topologies. As an update of the generation method we
would like to reproduce the so called ,,community of commu-
nities” structure, or to take into account other properties during
the generation phase such as the similarity of nodes [14]. Based
on the results of investigation existing heterogeneous human-
computer networks it would be also interesting to reproduce
them using our method.
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